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something about what Bölsche -despite all due criticism -pioneered, which today has reemerged and is again inspiring research in many arts faculties around the globe: evolutionist or cognitive approaches to literary study, which not only draw on our traditional sources of epistemological authority, humanistic and socio-cultural discourses, but also on the discourses of natural science. 4 So that reading Bölsche in that sense at least might be of value to us.
A few words by way of introducing Bölsche. influence on her biologistic version of New Woman feminism is documented. 5 Bölsche was a man of letters, who depended on his pen for his living. He wrote in several modes and genres.
In literature, there are two early historical novels, Paulus (1885) and Der Zauber des Königs Arpus (1887), right at the end of that genre's fashionability, then a rather good contemporary social novel Die Mittagsgöttin (1891), 6 which is a subtle treatment of the spiritualism phenomenon and shades from high naturalism, with celebrations of electric street lighting, the techno-sublime dynamism of steam locomotives and the quasi-Darwinian cellular macrostructure of mass urban existence, into genuinely aesthetic modernist meditations on the unconscious desires constituting the structure of the modern self, yet ultimately (as the title 4 An introduction to this is Karl Eibl, Kultur the world than that produced by scientistic discourse under its truth conditions. This is the meaning of the frankly Romantic word 'genius', which for Bölsche even after Darwin applies to the artist's (and indeed animals') intuitive, but also physiological, ability to make creative, that is, adaptive leaps forward.
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Now if you are thinking that this move from natural selection to aesthetic genius romanticises the process of evolution, resolving the incipient two cultures problem by projecting into nature in the manner of an uncritical Kantian constitutive idea the notion of nature as creative artist of evolution, and of the artist as a kind of natura naturans in the second degree, then you are right. This leads us into perhaps Bölsche's most influential field of activity. Bölsche was not only a monist, but also a socialist utopian, and like Bruno Wille devoted a good deal of his time to addressing workers' associations with improving talks about literary and scientific culture, in an age, let us recall, when in the wake of the Kulturkampf the teaching of biology, let alone evolution, had been banned from German schools. The two Goethe texts we shall be looking at arise from this field of his activity, and Turning to Goethe im 20. Jahrhundert let us note that this is a laudation, epideictic speech.
Thus we hear that Goethe is for Germans in the dawning century a myth, a hero, a colossus, the worthy object of an authentic 'Heroen-Kultus' (Goethe im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, pp. the notion of humanity in India, to its initial unfolding in Greece, the universalisation of that idea in Rome and its religious inflection in Christianity, and the secularisation of that thought in the Renaissance. Bölsche impishly notes in this context that one of Raphael's familiar putti from the Sistine Madonna looks just like a baby Goethe, as if in anticipatory divination of Goethe's advent (see Figure 1 ).
Thus humanity experiences its highest refinement so far in Goethe himself, as the embodiment of a notional maximum development of human perfection. Taking up Haeckel's image of evolution as a tree (see Figure 2 ), Bölsche calls Goethe the newest, greatest ring of the tree of humanity (Goethe, pp. 21-22), more than mere culmination, rather encompassing all previous manifestations of the human and drawing their sum, self-conscious of his place in this development (Goethe, pp. 24-25). In short, rather as for Haeckel in his famous What is left -and Bölsche's two examples are a theologian and a gorilla -, will necessarily struggle for supremacy and lose out in the evolutionary process (51-52).
Thus here at last we come to Bölsche's evolutionary version of Novalis. If Goethe was 
Novalis too, then, is at least potentially a 'Vorgänger Darwins', and perhaps Darwin is by the same token not only a 'Nachfolger Goethes', but also a successor to Friedrich von Hardenberg.
Bölsche seems to have been particularly fascinated by Novalis. There is nothing unusual about that. Around this time, of course, there was a general awakening of interest in Novalis's work, as the mindset of the Jahrhundertwende, jaded by a century of grim pragmatic realism, recognised its transhistorical affinity with his declared aestheticism, his focus on subjectivity and sensitivity to liminal states of consciousness, and his determined philosophico-poetic attempts to think, represent, and generate a utopian holistic, spiritualised and healed universe. There is something to be learned from Bölsche's engagement with the two cultures issue beyond the familiar lessons of mid-twentieth-century German history. The lesson is not only that the two cultures problem has not gone away, but that the relationship between them has moved on and changed the terms of engagement from those around 1900. We all had to be reminded of the urgency of the issue by Joseph Carroll's literary Darwinist polemics.
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Carroll deployed arguments and applications which were more or less persuasive. Like
Bölsche, he in my view rightly argued (Carroll, pp. ix-xii) that we in the humanities ignore at our peril the well-founded cultural prestige of the natural sciences. In particular, he took the view that the problem lay on the humanities side, the cause being the humanities' defensive retreat into epistemological isolation and isolationism as the sciences grew dominant. The symptom of this for Carroll was the radical autonomy claimed by both humanities and social sciences in their epistemological models, as self-referential epistemological constructs which by definition could not be related to the observationally founded and experimentally tested theories in the science faculty, which protected their enterprise (solipsistically at least), but also begged the question of their own utility and relevance for the wider human project. Some of those who laboured with unrewarded good will over some of the more abstruse theoretical 
